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HARVEY, IRMA, AND THE NFIP: DID THE 2017 HURRICANE SEASON MATTER TO 
FLOOD INSURANCE REAUTHORIZATION? 
 
Robin Kundis Craig* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has become a 
coastal hurricane insurance program—a fact that is bankrupting it. As a 
result of climate change, the ocean surrounding the United States is both 
rising and becoming warmer, and hurricanes and other coastal storms are 
projected to become both more frequent and more destructive. While no 
particular hurricane can yet be blamed exclusively on climate change, these 
projections nevertheless have real implications for the future of the NFIP. 
 
 In 2017, Congress was gearing up to reauthorize the NFIP just as 
the United States entered its worst hurricane season in over a decade. This 
Article examines how hurricanes and other coastal storms have affected the 
NFIP, both in terms of it solvency and its potential goals. Specifically, after 
reviewing the NFIP’s history and its interactions with coastal hurricanes 
and storms, the Article explores the process of re-authorizing the NFIP in 
2017 and 2018 while the United States was suffering through Hurricanes 
Harvey and Irma. It concludes that Congress is showing some signs of 
reforming the NFIP to take account of the increasing vulnerability of 
coastal properties but that the NFIP could do much more to promote 
climate change adaptability. 
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INTRODUCTION:  
INSURANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
 
In April 2014, Farmers Insurance Company filed nine high-profile class-action 
lawsuits on behalf of itself, other insurance companies, and policyholders with damaged 
properties against approximately 200 Chicago-area municipalities, arguing that these 
municipalities were failing to deal with climate change.1 Specifically, Farmers Insurance 
alleged that these cities and counties were aware that climate change was leading to 
heavier rains but were failing to upgrade their water infrastructure—especially sewers 
and stormwater drains—in response.2 The lawsuit came almost exactly one year after 
Illinois Governor Pat Quinn (D) declared a state of emergency in the face of 
unprecedented rains that flooded Chicago, overwhelming sewers, creating “geysers of 
wastewater,” and turning city streets to rivers navigable by kayak and canoe.3 The losses 
from the spring 2013 flooding totaled at least $218 million—and much of that loss was 
covered by insurance.4 
 
While Farmers Insurance dropped its lawsuits in early June 2014,5 those lawsuits 
still served to highlight the potential role of insurance in climate change adaptation. For 
example, ThinkProgress noted in May 2014 that: 
 
Insurance companies are becoming increasingly concerned, and more vocal, 
about the rising costs of climate change. With large fossil fuel companies 
reluctant to take greenhouse gas mitigation efforts in the face of potential 
profit losses, the behemoth insurance industry could provide a 
																																																						
1 Ari Phillips, “In Landmark Class Action, Farmers Insurance Sues Local Governments for Ignoring 
Climate Change,” ThinkProgress, https://thinkprogress.org/in-landmark-class-action-farmers-insurance-
sues-local-governments-for-ignoring-climate-change-19c31eef042e#.q33quzenc (May 19, 2014). 
2 Id. The municipalities acquired this knowledge, the lawsuit further claimed, through a 2008 climate 
change action plan and a 2011 report from the regional water management authority detailing the 
deficiencies. Gail Sullivan, “Climate change: Get ready or get sued,” The Washington Post, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/05/19/climate-change-get-ready-or-get-
sued/?utm_term=.609be5771e1f (May 19, 2014). 
3 Gail Sullivan, “Climate change: Get ready or get sued,” The Washington Post, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/05/19/climate-change-get-ready-or-get-
sued/?utm_term=.609be5771e1f (May 19, 2014) (quoting The Chicago Tribune). 
4 Rob Wile, “An Insurance Company Is Suing 200 Illinois Towns for Not Being Better Prepared for Climate 
Change,” Business Insider Science, http://www.businessinsider.com/farmers-sues-towns-over-climate-
damage-2014-5 (May 18, 2014). 
5 Robert McCoppin, “Insurance company drops suits over Chicago-area flooding,” The Chicago Tribune, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-chicago-flooding-insurance-lawsuit-20140603-
story.html (June 3, 2014). 
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counterbalance to the energy industry when it comes to incentivizing near-
term emissions cuts, or at least adaptation to the effects of climate change.6 
 
The Christian Science Monitor reported similarly that “insurance companies are vocal 
about the rising costs of global warming and want to push cities to invest in prevention 
as a way to avoid future lawsuits.”7 Somewhat perversely, however, one of the 
immediate responses to Farmers Insurance’s lawsuits was to strengthen governments’ 
immunity from such tort liability.8 
 
The fact that the law can create incentives is well-documented in the literature9; 
indeed, creating incentives to guide human behavior is often one of law’s primary goals 
and purposes.10 The fact that some of these legal incentives are or become perverse is also 
well-documented in the literature,11 especially in environmental and natural resource 
regulation.12 
 
 Insurance, in turn, operates primarily to mitigate risk.13 By changing the costs or 
potential costs to private actors of certain behaviors, insurance makes those behaviors less 
risky to specific individuals by effectively spreading the costs over a larger population of 
at-risk individuals, not all of whom will actually suffer harm.14 As a result, insurance can 
																																																						
6 Ari Phillips, “In Landmark Class Action, Farmers Insurance Sues Local Governments for Ignoring 
Climate Change,” ThinkProgress, https://thinkprogress.org/in-landmark-class-action-farmers-insurance-
sues-local-governments-for-ignoring-climate-change-19c31eef042e#.q33quzenc (May 19, 2014). 
7 Mica Rosenberg, “Climate change lawsuits filed against some 200 US communities,” The Christian 
Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/Latest-News-Wires/2014/0517/Climate-
change-lawsuits-filed-against-some-200-US-communities (May 17, 2014). 
8 David Ormsby, “Climate Change Lawsuits Could Again Haunt Illinois Cities,” The Huffington Post, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-ormsby/climate-change-lawsuits-c_b_5631969.html (July 30, 
2014). 
9 E.g. Lynn D. Wardle, Dilemmas of Indissoluble Parenthood: Legal Incentives, Parenting, and the Work-
Life Balance, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 265, 296, 299 (2012); Todd D. Rakoff, Social Structure, Legal Structure, 
and Default Rules: A Comment, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 19, 25 (Fall 1993). 
10 E.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Form, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 348-49 (Jan. 1991). 
11 Wardle, supra note 9, at 265. 
12 E.g., J. Peter Byrne, Precipice Regulations and Perverse Incentives: Comparing Historic Preservation 
and Endangered Species Listing, 27 GEO. INT’L ENVT’L L. REV. 343, 344-46 (Spring 2015); Byron Swift, 
How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility Sector’s Response to Regulation of Nitrogen 
Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TULANE ENVT’L L.J. 309, 393 n.390 (Summer 
2001). 
13 Qihao He, Mitigation of Climate Change Risks and Regulation by Insurance: A Feasible Proposal for 
China, 43 BOSTON COLL. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 319, 325 (2016); Edward P. Richards, Applying Life 
Insurance Principles to Coastal Property Insurance to Incentivize Adaptation to Climate Change, 43 
BOSTON COLL. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 427, 430 (2016). 
14 He, supra note 13, at 324-25; Richards, supra note 13, at 431. 
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directly incentivize actions—like living on the coast—that would otherwise be too risky 
for anyone except the extremely wealthy to undertake.15 
 
 Both the law and the availability of insurance have been instrumental in 
promoting coastal development. This Article focuses on the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) and its relationship to coastal hurricanes, arguing that the NFIP provides 
a quintessential example of perverse legal incentives for the coast in a climate change era. 
By allowing homeowners both to pay below-market insurance rates and to recover 
multiple times for flooded properties, the NFIP incentivizes development of the 
floodplains and coast—two geographic areas where climate change adaptation strategies 
would benefit from legal incentives for infrastructure withdrawals. Instead, the NFIP is 
increasing becoming a National Hurricane Insurance Program, with major hurricanes 
along the Gulf and East Coasts of the United States driving most of the program’s major 
payouts. Hurricane-related payouts are a significant reason why the NFIP is close to 
bankruptcy, and the prominence of hurricanes in the NFIP is also creating regional 
tensions, with western states largely subsidizing states on the Gulf and East Coasts. 
 
 The NFIP came up for reauthorization in 2017—just as the United States was 
experiencing its worst hurricane season in over a decade. As a result, this most recent 
reauthorization process offers a window into how—or whether—Congress is thinking 
about the relationships among climate change, insurance incentives, and federal fiscal 
liabilities. This Article begins with an overview of the NFIP and its growing relationship 
with coastal hurricanes. Part II will then review the 2017 hurricane season, including the 
implications of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma for the NFIP. Part III then examines the NFIP 
reauthorization process in more detail, focusing on H.R.2874, “The 21st Century Flood 
Reform Act,” which the House of Representatives passed in November 2017 and which 
is still awaiting a Senate response. The Article concludes that, while Congress appears to 
be taking some important steps toward recognizing the vulnerability of coasts, it could 
still do much more to transform the NFIP into a program that actively promotes climate 
change adaptation. 
 
  
I.  THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (NFIP) 
 
 Specifically because private insurance would not cover flood-prone areas, 
Congress enacted the National Flood Insurance Program in 1968. Today, coastal property 
owners are both the primary beneficiaries and the primary bankrupters of the program, 
particularly because of increasing numbers of increasingly expensive losses caused by 
hurricanes. Given that climate change is expected to increase both the frequency and the 
																																																						
15 Richards, supra note 13, at 428. 
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severity of these costly coastal storms, it is worth re-examining the NFIP’s role in the 
Anthropocene. 
 
A. Overview of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
 
The National Flood Insurance Program attempts to “correct” decades of 
increasing flood damage for which the federal government was limited to providing post-
disaster relief.16 After Hurricane Betsy devastated the Gulf of Mexico coast in 1965, 
Congress enacted the Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act,17 which authorized an 
insurance feasibility study.18 The resulting 1966 study recommended a federal flood 
insurance program,19 and in 1968 Congress created the National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) through the National Flood Insurance Act (NFIA).20 The primary purposes of the 
NFIP are to “[b]etter indemnify individuals for flood losses through insurance; [r]educe 
future flood damages through State and community floodplain management regulations; 
and [r]educe Federal expenditures for disaster assistance and flood control.”21  
 
Unlike most private insurance, the NFIP directs its incentive structures toward 
municipalities, not private behavior. Specifically, the NFIP uses insurance coverage as an 
incentive to local governments to encourage them to regulate to reduce flood damage, 
enabling “property owners in participating communities to purchase insurance as a 
protection against flood losses in exchange for State and community floodplain 
management regulations that reduce future flood damages.”22 As such, unlike much 
traditional property insurance, the NFIP generally focuses less on how individual 
property owners behave than on how municipalities regulate: “If a community adopts and 
enforces a floodplain management ordinance to reduce future flood risk to new 
construction in floodplains, the Federal Government will make flood insurance available 
within the community as a financial protection against flood losses.”23  
 
																																																						
16 FEDERAL INSURANCE & MITIGATION ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 1 (Aug. 2002), available at 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1447-20490-2156/nfipdescrip_1_.pdf [hereinafter 
2002 FEMA NFIP OVERVIEW]. 
17 Pub. L. No. 89-339, 79 Stat. 1301 (Nov. 8, 1965). 
18 Sarah Fox, This Is Adaptation: The Elimination of Subsidies Under the National Flood Insurance 
Program, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 213–14 (2014); see also 2002 FEMA NFIP OVERVIEW, supra note 
16, at 1-2 (providing a similar history). 
19 2002 FEMA NFIP OVERVIEW, supra note 16, at 2. 
20 Id.; PUB. L. NO. 90-448, Tit. XIII, § 1301 et seq., 82 Stat. 476, 572 (1968), codified as amended as 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4001-4131. 
21 2002 FEMA NFIP OVERVIEW, supra note 16, at 2. 
22 Id. at 1. 
23 Id. See also GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FLOOD INSURANCE: REVIEW OF FEMA STUDY AND 
REPORT ON COMMUNITY-BASED OPTIONS 4 (Aug. 2016), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679214.pdf [hereinafter 2016 GAO FLOOD INSURANCE REPORT]. 
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The NFIP does, however, seek to make both governments and individuals more 
cognizant of flooding risks. For example, the NFIP requires the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) to identify and map floodplains, which “creates broad-
based awareness of the flood hazards and provides the data needed for floodplain 
management programs and to actuarially rate new construction for flood insurance.”24 
Since the 1973 amendments, moreover, the NFIP also requires property owners to 
“purchase flood insurance if they live in a ‘Special Flood Hazard Area’ (SFHA) and have 
a mortgage from a federally backed or regulated lender.”25 As FEMA explains, 
 
the 1973 Act required that Federal agencies and federally insured or 
regulated lenders had to require flood insurance on all grants and loans 
for acquisition or construction of buildings in designated Special Flood 
Hazard Areas (SFHAs) in communities that participate in the NFIP. 
This requirement is referred to as the Mandatory Flood Insurance 
Purchase Requirement. The SFHA is that land within the floodplain of 
a community subject to a 1 percent or greater chance of flooding in any 
given year, commonly referred to as the 100-year flood.26 
 
In 2009, the federal government issued 5,700,235 flood insurance policies to 
individual homeowners within communities participating in the NFIP, which was the 
highest number of policies issued in a given year.27 While the number of issued policies 
has slightly declined since 2009, the federal government still issues over five million 
flood insurance policies every year.28  
 
B. The NFIP on the Coasts 
 
Originally, the goal of the NFIP was to “mov[e] people out of harm’s way,” but 
it has “morphed into a program that moved them right into harm’s way, indeed paying 
																																																						
24 2002 FEMA NFIP OVERVIEW, supra note 16, at 2. 
25 A. Dan Tarlock & Deborah M. Chizewer, Living with Water in A Climate-Changed World: Will Federal 
Flood Policy Sink or Swim?, 46 ENVTL. L. 491, 506 (2016). 
26 2002 FEMA NFIP OVERVIEW, supra note 16, at 3. 
27 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Total Policies in Force by Calendar Year, 
https://www.fema.gov/total-policies-force-calendar-year (as updated May 11, 2016, and viewed April 1, 
2017). 
28 Id. For example, “[a]t the end of 2012, NFIP provided more than 5.6 million insurance policies, insuring 
$1.25 trillion in assets but collecting only $3.6 billion in total premiums.” UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS, OVERWHELMING RISK: RETHINKING FLOOD INSURANCE IN A WORLD OF RISING SEAS 7 fig. 4 
(2013), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/impacts/flood-
insurance-sea-level-rise.html#.WN6KD2Vd2JU [hereinafter 2013 UCS FLOOD INSURANCE REPORT]. In 
2014, the federal government issued 5,406,725 policies, and in 2015, the federal government issued 
5,206,241 NFIP policies. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Total Policies in Force by 
Calendar Year, https://www.fema.gov/total-policies-force-calendar-year (as updated May 11, 2016, and 
viewed April 1, 2017). 
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them with cheap insurance to move [to flood prone areas.]”29 As scholars have 
emphasized, “[b]y providing subsidized flood insurance to coastal properties, the NFIP 
encourages Americans to purchase property on the coast.”30 Moreover, while the NFIP 
still encourages better building codes and land use regulation along the coast, those 
measures are often inadequate. For example, raised houses in New Orleans were still 
“smashed by walls of water fifteen- to twenty-feet high” during Hurricane Katrina.31  
 
Property owners in coastal states are the primary beneficiaries of the NFIP. Of the 
states where more than 60,000 NFIP policies were in force in 2016, for example, all but 
Pennsylvania (64,588 policies) are coastal states—in descending order by number of 
policies, these states include Florida (1,813,592), Texas (589,357), Louisiana (452,680), 
California (304,388), New Jersey (233,789), South Carolina (201,373), New York 
(188,530), North Carolina (130,258), Virginia (106,005), Georgia (89,295), Maryland 
(68,386), Mississippi (66,169), Massachusetts (64,689), and Hawaii (60,199).32  
 
Coastal properties also dominate repetitive loss payments from the NFIP—that is, 
repeat payments resulting from more than one flooding disaster.33 Repetitive-loss 
properties are the primary evidence of the NFIP’s perverse incentive structure because 
they represent the program’s facilitation of rebuilding in risky areas, rather than 
encouraging property owners to migrate inland.34  
 
Repetitive-loss properties are also an important cause of the NFIP’s insolvency. 
According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, “NFIP has paid out almost $9 billion in 
claims to repetitive-loss properties, which amounts to about a quarter of all payments 
since 1978. Repetitive-loss properties . . . account for just 1.3 percent of all policies but 
are responsible for fully 25 percent of all NFIP claim payments since 1978.”35 Some of 
																																																						
29 Oliver A. Houck, Retaking the Exam: How Environmental Law Failed New Orleans and the Gulf Coast 
South and How It Might Yet Succeed, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1059, 1078–79 (2007) 
30 Jenna Shweitzer, Climate Change Legal Remedies: Hurricane Sandy and New York City Coastal 
Adaptation, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 243, 249-50 (2014). 
31 Houck, supra note 29, at 1078–79. 
32 2016 GAO FLOOD INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 23, at 7 fig. 1. 
33 2013 UCS FLOOD INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 9 & fig. 6. 
34 “[S]horeline and climate experts, public officials and others have grown increasingly critical of [programs 
like the NFIP that insure repetitive losses along the coast], arguing that they encourage rebuilding in places 
that have already shown themselves to be flood-prone and are likely to become more so because of climate 
change and its associated sea level rise.” Jan Ellen Spiegel, “CT’s repeat flood damage dilemma: move out 
or rebuild?”, The CT Mirror, https://ctmirror.org/2015/10/09/cts-repeat-flood-damage-dilemma-move-out-
or-rebuild/ (Oct. 9, 2015). 
35 2013 UCS FLOOD INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 9 fig. 6. According to Scientific American, 
“Properties that flood repeatedly represent about 1 percent of the total policies of the program but add up 
to 25 to 30 percent of the claims. The also represent about $12 billion of the program’s $23 billion debt.” 
Erika Boldstad, “Insurance May Be Dropped for Properties That Repeatedly Flood,” Scientific American, 
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the individual stories defy common sense: Some properties have made over 40 claims 
each; “[o]ne property in Houston received 16 payouts totaling $806,591, more than seven 
times the structure’s value;” and “[o]ne house in Alabama, valued at $153,000, has 
received $2.25 million in NFIP payouts . . .”36 As of April 2016, FEMA had identified 
approximately 11,900 remaining NFIP-insured properties that qualify as severe 
repetitive-loss properties,37 up from approximately 9000 such properties identified in 
2011.38 While amendments to the NFIP in 2004 allowed the federal government to buy 
out repetitive-loss property owners,39 epetitive-loss coastal properties have become 
political and financial issues in Connecticut,40 Florida,41 Louisiana,42 and Texas.43 
 
Coastal properties “are currently insured by a combination of National Flood 
Insurance Program (“NFIP”) policies, some private excess coverage for flooding, and 
federal disaster relief that is provided after specific events. This bundle of resources is 
highly subsidized and encourages rebuilding in areas that are already at high risk and 
which will eventually be inundated.”44  The NFIP “provides residential coverage up to 
																																																						
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/insurance-may-be-dropped-for-properties-that-repeatedly-
flood/ (Sept. 29, 2016). 
36 U.C. Davis Center for Watershed Sciences, California, Flood Risk, and the National Flood Insurance 
Program, https://californiawaterblog.com/2016/12/14/california-flood-risk-and-the-national-flood-
insurance-program/ (Dec. 14, 2016). 
37 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Guidance for Severe Repetitive-Loss Properties 1 
(April 2016), available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1458756489938-
3dc4734e1bf9db98026948383a4493eb/21_srl_508_apr2016.pdf. However, other studies put the number 
of repetitive-loss properties in 2016 at over 30,000. U.C. Davis Center for Watershed Sciences, California, 
Flood Risk, and the National Flood Insurance Program, 
https://californiawaterblog.com/2016/12/14/california-flood-risk-and-the-national-flood-insurance-
program/ (Dec. 14, 2016). 
38 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Guidance for Severe Repetitive-Loss Properties 1 
(Oct. 2011), available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/nfip/manual201205/content/20_srl.pdf. 
39 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Repetitive Flood Claims Grant Program Fact Sheet, 
https://www.fema.gov/repetitive-flood-claims-grant-program-fact-sheet (as updated April 15, 2015, and 
viewed April 1, 2017). 
40 Jan Ellen Spiegel, “CT’s repeat flood damage dilemma: move out or rebuild?”, The CT Mirror, 
https://ctmirror.org/2015/10/09/cts-repeat-flood-damage-dilemma-move-out-or-rebuild/ (Oct. 9, 2015). 
41 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA), ANALYSIS OF FLORIDA’S NFIP REPETITIVE-
LOSS PROPERTIES USING GEOSPATIAL TOOLS AND FIELD VERIFICATION DATA 6 (April 30, 2005), available 
at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1712-25045-
1952/analysis_of_florida_s_nfip_repetitive_loss_properties_using_geospatial_tools_and_field_verrificati
on_data.pdf. 
42 U.C. Davis Center for Watershed Sciences, California, Flood Risk, and the National Flood Insurance 
Program, https://californiawaterblog.com/2016/12/14/california-flood-risk-and-the-national-flood-
insurance-program/ (Dec. 14, 2016). 
43 Id. 
44 Richards, supra note 13, at 428.  
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$250,000 for the structure and $100,000 for contents, and up to $500,000 for business 
structures and $500,000 for business contents.”45  
 
C. The NFIP, Hurricanes, and Incentives 
 
In a very real sense, the NFIP defies both the realities of coastal dynamics and the 
logic of insurance schemes. Part of the issue is subsidized premiums for properties located 
in areas likely to flood, which make the program financially untenable in the long run—
but homeowners remain unwilling to pay the real cost of building along a coast. Indeed, 
the NFIP exists in large part because “[p]rimary insurers—those that sell standard 
insurance policies to individuals and businesses—. . . could not charge affordable 
premiums and profit when private flood insurance was proposed in the 1950s.”46 As 
noted, however, the federal government has also not been able to make the program pay 
for itself: 
 
The NFIP is designed to pay losses and operating expenses out of 
policyholder premiums. However, the premiums that NFIP 
policyholders have paid have historically been insufficient to cover the 
program's losses from flood claims. This is primarily because to achieve 
the NFIP's objectives, many NFIP policyholders have long received 
heavily subsidized premium rates. Premium discounts have long been 
‘given to any structure that was built before FEMA had mapped the 
flood risk in an area (referred to as pre-FIRM structures),’ in addition to 
several other categories of homeowners. Even in [special flood hazard 
areas]—the areas most prone to damage from flooding—pre-FIRM 
structures have historically enjoyed grandfathered rates. Policymakers 
justified these discounts on the theory that lower rates would convince 
more communities to join the NFIP, that high premiums would deter 
insurance purchases, and that high rates could force the abandonment of 
economically viable buildings. In 2013, roughly twenty percent of flood 
insurance policies nationwide received discounts, typically worth fifty-
five to sixty percent off the full-risk price. FEMA's 2011 Actuarial Rate 
Review noted that, because of discounted premium rates, “it is currently 
impractical for the NFIP to be actuarially sound in the aggregate.”47 
 
The GAO, similarly, has noted that “[a]s a result of the program’s importance, level of 
indebtedness to Treasury, and substantial financial exposure for the federal government 
																																																						
45 Id. at 446-47. 
46 Michael Thrasher, “The Private Flood Insurance Market Is Stirring After More Than 50 Years of 
Dormancy,” Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelthrasher/2016/08/26/the-private-flood-
insurance-market-is-stirring-after-more-than-50-years-of-dormancy/#7889d6e96dda (Aug. 26, 2016). 
47 Fox, supra note 18, at 217. 
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and taxpayers, as well as FEMA’s operating and management challenges, NFIP has been 
on our high-risk list since 2006.”48 
 
More basically, the NFIP incentivizes building in the wrong places, including 
along the coast. Indeed, one researcher noted that: 
 
The NFIP is an actuarial joke. It would be like having a federal 
automobile insurance company that only insured teenage boys who 
drink and drive. By definition the properties covered by the program are 
doomed to be flooded, damaged, and even destroyed, not just once, but 
time and time again.49 
 
FEMA itself has recognized that the NFIP exists because private insurance schemes for 
the properties it insures cannot function profitably. Thus: 
 
As early as the 1950’s, when the feasibility of providing flood insurance 
was first proposed, it became clear that private insurance companies 
could not profitably provide such coverage at an affordable price, 
primarily because of the catastrophic nature of flooding and the inability 
to develop an actuarial rate structure which could adequately reflect the 
risk to which flood-prone properties are exposed.50 
 
Thus, the NFIP has always stepped in where private insurance companies feared to tread, 
creating incentives to build in risky areas like coasts that the private market would not 
support.51 
 
Recent studies more concretely pinpoint the roles of coastal properties and 
hurricanes in the NFIP’s insolvency. Increasing numbers of increasingly damaging and 
expensive coastal storms in the 21st century have underscored the financial incoherence 
of the NFIP in a climate change era. “Almost 50 years [after its creation], the NFIP is $25 
billion in debt, partly because of these subsidized rates that do not reflect the true cost of 
owning coastal property.”52 Hurricanes and other severe coastal storms have strained the 
																																																						
48 2016 GAO FLOOD INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 23, at 1. 
49 Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Legal Castles in the Sand: The Evolution of Property Law, Culture, and 
Ecology in Coastal Lands, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 213, 235-36 (2011) (citing Dwight H. Merriam, 
Regulating Rebuilding in Developed Areas Following Disasters, in JOHN R. NOLON & DANIEL B. 
RODRIGUEZ, EDS., LOSING GROUND: A NATION ON EDGE 325, 326 (2007)). 
50 2002 FEMA NFIP OVERVIEW, supra note 16, at 1. 
51 See 2013 UCS FLOOD INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 1 (“In the face of increasingly unmanageable 
risks, many private insurers have left the coastal insurance market. The National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) is now practically the sole provider of flood insurance for home owners and small businesses 
nationwide.”). 
52 Shweitzer, supra note 30, at 250. 
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NFIP far into insolvency, reflecting both an increasing frequency of these storms and the 
increasing physical and financial damage that they can inflict. As for frequency, 
 
Starting in the 1990s, major storms began rolling into the Gulf of 
Mexico like bowling balls. Eight of the most damaging hurricanes in 
history came ashore in the next decade: Opal, Danny, Georges, Frances, 
Lili, Ivan, Katrina, and Rita. Losses soared. In 2001, NFIP payouts 
topped a billion dollars. In 2005, they topped over thirteen billion, and 
they broke the bank. Losses were over thirty billion cumulatively 
through 2006.53  
 
However, the increasing amount of and wealth invested in coastal infrastructure has also 
helped to make more recent storms more costly: 
 
Prior to Tropical Storm Allison in 2001, the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) had never experienced a storm resulting in over $1 
billion in damage. Since then, however, Hurricane Katrina imposed a 
death toll estimated to range from just under 1,000 to nearly 2,000 and 
caused an estimated $148 billion in total damages and costs; Hurricane 
Irene in 2010 caused 45 deaths and $10.1 billion in total damages and 
costs; and Superstorm Sandy in 2012 resulted in 159 deaths and $65.7 
billion in total damages and costs.54  
 
NFIP collects about $3.3 billion in premiums each year,55 but that has not been 
enough in this century to cover its losses—primarily because of coastal hurricanes. As 
the Government Accountability Office noted in a report to Congress in August 2016, 
 
Since 2000, NFIP has experienced several years with catastrophic 
losses, primarily from Hurricane Katrina and the other 2005 storms and 
Superstorm Sandy in 2012. Since then, FEMA has needed to borrow 
money from the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to cover 
claims in some years. As of March 2016, FEMA owed Treasury $23 
billion.56  
 
																																																						
53 Houck, supra note 29, at 1078. 
54 Fox, supra note 18, at 206–07. 
55 Michael Thrasher, “The Private Flood Insurance Market Is Stirring After More Than 50 Years of 
Dormancy,” Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelthrasher/2016/08/26/the-private-flood-
insurance-market-is-stirring-after-more-than-50-years-of-dormancy/#7889d6e96dda (Aug. 26, 2016). 
56 2016 GAO FLOOD INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 23, at 1 (Aug. 2016). 
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The “NFIP paid out more claims in 2005 [following Hurricane Katrina] than it had paid 
out over the entire life of the program to that point.”57 Hurricane Katrina, for example, 
made Louisiana the second-largest recipient of NFIP payments; without that event, 
Louisiana would rank number 12.58 Because “FEMA had insufficient funds to cover the 
claims, and Congress had to increase NFIP's borrowing authority to $20.775 billion. 
Following Superstorm Sandy, that borrowing limit was increased again to $30 billion.”59 
Superstorm Sandy had similarly distorting impacts on NFIP payments and was 
singlehandedly responsible for making New Jersey and New York top-10 NFIP payment 
recipients.60 These two storms thus demonstrate the sensitivity of the NFIP to hurricanes 
and other major coastal storm events. 
 
 In anticipation of the 2017 reauthorization of the NFIP, the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) prepared a report61 on the program’s fiscal soundness that underscores the 
distorting role that coastal properties and hurricane exposure are playing. The CBO 
concluded overall that the NFIP “had an expected one-year shortfall of $1.4 billion,”62 
which “is attributable largely to premiums’ falling short of expected costs in coastal 
counties, which constitute roughly 10 percent of all counties with NFIP policies but 
account for three-quarters of all NFIP policies nationwide.”63 Specifically, coastal 
counties had a net shortfall of $1.5 billion, while inland counties had a net surplus of $200 
million.64 The coastal counties’ shortfall, moreover, arises because premiums “do not 
cover the expected cost of wave damage from storm surges.”65 
 
 The CBO’s report became even more targeted, however. It estimated “that the 33 
counties with a shortfall of more than $10 million accounted for nearly 90 percent of the 
																																																						
57 Fox, supra note 18, at 218. 
58 U.C. Davis Center for Watershed Sciences, California, Flood Risk, and the National Flood Insurance 
Program, https://californiawaterblog.com/2016/12/14/california-flood-risk-and-the-national-flood-
insurance-program/ (Dec. 14, 2016). 
59 Fox, supra note 18, at 218. 
60 U.C. Davis Center for Watershed Sciences, California, Flood Risk, and the National Flood Insurance 
Program, https://californiawaterblog.com/2016/12/14/california-flood-risk-and-the-national-flood-
insurance-program/ (Dec. 14, 2016). Eliminating the payments from Superstorm Sandy, New Jersey ranks 
#15 and New York ranks #16. Id. 
61 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: FINANCIAL 
SOUNDNESS AND AFFORDABILITY (Sept. 2017), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53028 
[hereinafter 2017 CBO NFIP REPORT]. 
62 Id. at 1. 
63 Id. at 2. See also id. at 13 (“Counties that CBP defined as coastal for this analysis—those with at least 
some expected claims from storm surges or for which precipitation from coastal storms (hurricanes, tropical 
storms, and nor-easters) accounted for more than 75 percent of expected claims—represented only 10 
percent of all counties with NFIP policies. However, they accounted for most of the program’s total 
shortfall.”). 
64 Id. See also id. at 12 (“On net, coastal counties sow a large shortfall and inland counties show a relatively 
small surplus.”). 
65 Id. 
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$2 billion from all 823 counties with shortfalls”—and most of those 33 counties were 
located “along the southeast coast and the Gulf of Mexico.”66 In contrast, most of the 
counties with the highest surpluses were located “along the northeast and west coasts,”67 
creating a map of donor and recipient counties that shows how much of the rest of the 
nation subsidizes homeowners along the Gulf of Mexico and southeast Atlantic coasts.68 
 
 Coastal storm-related damages account for roughly two-thirds of NFIP payouts 
over the last 35 years.69 Flooding from hurricane-related storm surges account for 37 
percent of the payouts; from hurricane-related precipitation, 16 percent; from tropical 
storms, five percent; and from other kinds of coastal storms like nor’easters, two 
percent.70 In contrast, inland flooding causes only 36 percent of NFIP payouts.71 Thus, 
the NFIP truly is becoming a coastal hurricane insurance program. 
 
The NFIP also promotes a counter-adaptive psychological world view of coastal 
living. For example, property owners insured under NFIP appear to accept coastal damage 
and destruction as a normal event, not as a signal to consider relocation. Thus, in southern 
California in January 2016, “[m]assive waves cleared a 25-foot retaining wall and crashed 
into a Pacifica restaurant … bursting through the beachside windows and rushing over 
tables and chairs.”72 Although the restaurant has suffered the same damage in the past, the 
owner was counting on insurance to repair the damage yet again, in time for an upcoming 
event.73 Likewise, coastal flooding near Nantucket in February 2017 was described as a 
normal way of life.74  
 
 
 
																																																						
66 Id. at 12. 
67 Id. at 13. 
68 Id. at 14 fig. 2. See also id. at 15 (“the additional expected costs from wave damage are spread broadly 
among the NFIP policyholders, resulting in a cross-subsidy from inland counties (on average) to coastal 
counties. That is, some of the expected costs associated with coastal policies are covered by high premiums 
paid by policyholders in inland counties.”); id. at 16 (“Eighty-five percent of the policyholders for 
properties located in Zone V, the highest risk [and coastal] zone, do not pay rates that reflect their actual 
flood risk.”). 
69 Id. at 4. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Colleen Nowell & Michelle Roberts, “Waves Burst into Pacifica’s Moonraker Restaurant, Rushing Over 
Tables, Chairs,” NBC Bay Area, http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Waves-Burst-Into-Pacifica-
Restaurant-Rushing-Over-Tables-Chairs-411667915.html (Jan 24, 2017). 
73 Id. 
74 Caitlin Fichtel & Marc Fortier, “Winter Storm Moves Out of Boston; Coastal Flooding, Power Outages 
Possible,” NBC Boston, http://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/Preparations-Underway-for-Another-
Storm-413530223.html (Feb. 12, 2017). 
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II. THE 2017 HURRICANE SEASON, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE NFIP 
 
A. Hurricane Harvey: A Climate Change Connection to Record Rain 
 
Hurricane Harvey was a Category 4 hurricane that made landfall on the central 
Texas coast just north of Corpus Christi on August 25, 2017.75 At its first landfall, it was 
280 miles in diameter and had 130 mile-per-hour winds.76 It moved north to Houston the 
next day and remained there for four days, then made landfall a third time on August 29 
at Port Arthur and Beaumont, Texas, near the Louisiana border.77 While Hurricane 
Harvey concentrated its force on Texas and Louisiana, “[i]t affected 13 million people 
from Texas through Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky,” and at least 88 
people died as a result of the storm.78 
 
Storm surge from Hurricane Harvey ranged from three feet to 12.5 feet, with the 
highest storm surge occurring in Aransas County in a National Wildlife Refuge, limiting 
the amount of human damage.79 However, most of Hurricane Harvey’s damage came 
from flooding caused by unprecedented rainfall.80 As noted, the hurricane stalled out over 
Houston, dropping two feet of rain in the first 24 hours and 40 inches over 48 hours.81 
Two reservoirs overflowed.82 When the hurricane made landfall for the third time, “[i]t 
dumped 26 inches of rain in 24 hours” at the Louisiana border,83 then rained an additional 
10 inches on Nashville, Tennessee, on September 1.84  
 
																																																						
75 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 2018). 
76 CNN News, “Hurricane Harvey Aftermath: What happened and what’s next,” 
https://www.cnn.com/specials/us/hurricane-harvey (as viewed Feb. 19, 2018); Kimberly Amadeo, 
“Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-
harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 2018). 
77 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 2018). 
78 Id. 
79 Id.; Jason Samenow, “Harvey is a 1000-year flood event unprecedented in scale,” The Washington Post, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weather-gang/wp/2017/08/31/harvey-is-a-1000-year-
flood-event-unprecedented-in-scale/?utm_term=.a36393ce6b2f (Aug. 13, 2017). 
80 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 2018). 
81 Id. “In comparison Hurricane Katrina dropped just 5 to 10 inches of rain in 48 hours. Most of its flooding 
came from storm surges that overwhelmed the levee system.” Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id.; CNN News, “Hurricane Harvey Aftermath: What happened and what’s next,” 
https://www.cnn.com/specials/us/hurricane-harvey (as viewed Feb. 19, 2018). 
84 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 2018). 
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In an attempt to describe the scale of the rainfall, a Washington Post reporter noted 
that “[a]t least 20 inches of rain fell over an area (nearly 29,000 square miles) larger than 
10 states, including West Virginia and Maryland (by a factor of more than two)” and “[a]t 
least 30 inches of rain fell over an area (more than 11,000 square miles) equivalent to 
Maryland’s size.”85 At the storm’s peak on September 1, one-third of Houston was 
underwater,86 and “[t]otal rainfall hit 51.88 inches in Cedar Bayou on the outskirts of 
Houston. That’s a record for a single storm in the continental United States.”87  
 
In addition, “Harvey flooded 800 wastewater treatment facilities and 13 
Superfund sites. That spread sewage and toxic chemicals into the flooded areas.”88 On 
August 31, an Arkema chemical plant in Crosby, Texas, ignited after the hurricane 
disrupted the cooling system necessary to keep the chemicals stable.89 
 
“As of September 5, 2017, Hurricane Harvey damaged 203,000 homes, of which 
12,700 were destroyed.”90 At $125 billion in damages, the storm ranks second only to 
Hurricane Katrina (adjusted to 2017 dollars) as the most damaging storm in U.S. history 
according to NOAA’s National Hurricane Center.91 
 
Hurricane Harvey caused a “thousand-year flood,”92 reaching many victims that 
were outside the NFIP’s Special Flood Hazard Areas—a significant reason that only 
about one-fifth of Hurricane Harvey’s Texas victims had flood insurance93 despite the 
																																																						
85 Jason Samenow, “Harvey is a 1000-year flood event unprecedented in scale,” The Washington Post, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weather-gang/wp/2017/08/31/harvey-is-a-1000-year-
flood-event-unprecedented-in-scale/?utm_term=.a36393ce6b2f (Aug. 13, 2017). 
86 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 2018). 
87 Id.; CNN News, “Hurricane Harvey Aftermath: What happened and what’s next,” 
https://www.cnn.com/specials/us/hurricane-harvey (as viewed Feb. 19, 2018). 
88 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 2018). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 National Hurricane Center, National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Costliest U.S. tropical 
cyclones tables updated 1, 2 tbl. 3a, 3 tbl. 3b (Jan. 26, 2018), available at 
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/news/UpdatedCostliest.pdf. 
92 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 2018); Ari Blask & 
Ike Brannon, “Hurricane Harvey Proved We Need More Flood Insurance Competition,” Time, 
http://time.com/4927852/hurricane-harvey-flood-insurance/ (Sept. 5, 2017); Jason Samenow, “Harvey is a 
1000-year flood event unprecedented in scale,” The Washington Post, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weather-gang/wp/2017/08/31/harvey-is-a-1000-year-
flood-event-unprecedented-in-scale/?utm_term=.a36393ce6b2f (Aug. 13, 2017). 
93 Ari Blask & Ike Brannon, “Hurricane Harvey Proved We Need More Flood Insurance Competition,” 
Time, http://time.com/4927852/hurricane-harvey-flood-insurance/ (Sept. 5, 2017). In Louisiana and Texas 
combined, approximately 70 percent of the homes damaged by Harvey were not covered by flood 
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fact that there are more than 584,000 active NFIP policies in Texas, the second most 
heavily NFIP-insured state in the nation after Florida.94 Even so, as of early November 
2017, FEMA had paid out over $4 billion to NFIP policyholders damaged by Hurricane 
Harvey.95 
 
Harvey may be the first hurricane for which scientists agree that climate change 
played a surprisingly large role in the storm’s severity.96 In December 2017, two research 
groups found that Harvey’s record rainfall “was as much as 38 percent higher than would 
be expected in a world that was not warming.”97 Warmer-than-normal air temperatures, 
sea levels that are six inches higher than 20 years ago, and climate change-affected 
weather patterns that promote storm stalling may all have contributed to Harvey’s 
excessive precipitation.98 In addition, both studies “found that climate change roughly 
tripled the odds of a Harvey-type storm.”99 Thus, as climate scientists have predicted, it 
																																																						
insurance.  Matt Simon, “Flood Insurance and the historic 2017 Hurricane season,” Hill & Hamilton Ohio 
Insurance Blog, https://www.hillandhamilton.com/ohio-insurance-blog/flood-insurance-and-the-historic-
2017-hurricane-season (Sept. 22, 2017). 
94 Abby Livingston, “After hurricanes, Congress ponders future of flood insurance program,” The Texas 
Tribune, https://www.texastribune.org/2017/10/09/flood-insurance/ (Oct. 9, 2017). 
95 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA Will Recover $1.042 billion in Reinsurance from the 
Private Reinsurance Markets, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2017/12/05/fema-will-recover-1042-
billion-reinsurance-private-reinsurance-markets (Dec. 5, 2017).  
96 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 2018); Henry 
Fountain, “Scientists Link Hurricane Harvey’s Record Rainfall to Climate Change,” The New York Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/climate/hurricane-harvey-climate-change.html?_r=0 (Dec. 13, 
2017); Mark D. Risser & Michael F. Wehner, Attributable Human-Induced Changes in the Likelihood and 
Magnitude of the Observed Extreme Precipitation during Hurricane Harvey, 44:24 GEOPHYSICAL 
RESEARCH LETTERS 12,457, 12,457-64 (23 Dec. 2017); Geert Jan van Oldenborgh, Karin van der Wiel, 
Antonia Sebastian, Roop Singh, Julie Arrighi, Friederike Otto, Karsten Haustein, Sihan Li, Gabriel Vecchi, 
& Heidi Cullen, Attribution of extreme rainfall from Hurricane Harvey, August 2017, 12:12 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH LETTERS 124009, https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa9ef2 (13 Dec. 2017). 
97 Henry Fountain, “Scientists Link Hurricane Harvey’s Record Rainfall to Climate Change,” The New 
York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/climate/hurricane-harvey-climate-change.html?_r=0 
(Dec. 13, 2017); Michael Greshko, “Climate Change Likely Supercharged Hurricane Harvey,” National 
Geographic, https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/climate-change-study-hurricane-harvey-flood/ 
(Dec. 13, 2017) (reporting the same 38 percent high). See also Risser & Wehner, supra note 96, at 12,462-
63 (reporting 19 percent as most probable); Oldenborgh et al., supra note 96, at 1 (reporting 15 percent as 
most probable). 
98 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087 (Feb. 13, 2018); German 
Lopez, “How global warming likely made Harvey much worse, explained by a climatologist,” Vox, 
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/8/28/16214268/houston-floods-harvey-global-warming 
(Aug. 28, 2017). 
99 Michael Greshko, “Climate Change Likely Supercharged Hurricane Harvey,” National Geographic, 
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/climate-change-study-hurricane-harvey-flood/ (Dec. 13, 
2017); Oldenborgh et al., supra note 96, at 1. 
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appears that climate change is already increasing the likelihood of increasingly severe 
hurricanes. 
 
B. Hurricane Irma: A Historic Storm 
 
“Irma was the strongest storm on record in the Atlantic—excluding the Caribbean 
and Gulf of Mexico—with maximum winds of 185 mph and an unofficial wind gust of 
199 mph.”100 It remained a hurricane from August 31 until September 11, 2017.101 The 
storm stretched 650 miles from east to west and affected nine states in the United States, 
as well as devastating the Caribbean.102 At its peak, Irma’s cloud field covered 300,000 
square miles.103 It also “the first storm on record to maintain winds as strong as 185 mph 
for 37 hours.”104 
 
In the Caribbean, Hurricane Irma was sheer power. According to one reporter, 
“Its coastal storm surges were 20 feet above normal tide levels,” and the hurricane “held 
7 trillion watts of energy. That's twice as much as all bombs used in World War II. Its 
force was so powerful that earthquake seismometers recorded it. It generated the most 
accumulated cyclone energy in a 24-hour period.”105 
 
																																																						
100 Doyle Rice, “2017’s three monster hurricanes—Harvey, Irma, and Maria—among five costliest ever,” 
USA Today, https://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2018/01/30/2017-s-three-monster-hurricanes-
harvey-irma-and-maria-among-five-costliest-ever/1078930001/ (Jan. 30, 2018). See also CNN News, 
“Irma: A hurricane for the history books,” https://www.cnn.com/specials/hurricane-irma (as viewed Feb. 
19, 2018) (“Hurricane Irma is the strongest Atlantic basin hurricane ever recorded outside the Gulf of 
Mexico and the Caribbean Sea.”); Jonathan Belles, “2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Recap: 17 Moments 
We’ll Never Forget,” The Weather Channel, https://weather.com/storms/hurricane/news/2017-11-11-
moments-hurricane-season-atlantic-irma-maria-harvey (Nov. 28, 2017) (“Irma's peak intensity based on 
wind speed was the second highest in Atlantic basin history only behind Hurricane Allen in 1980, which 
had winds of 190 mph.”). 
101 CNN News, “Irma: A hurricane for the history books,” https://www.cnn.com/specials/hurricane-irma 
(as viewed Feb. 19, 2018). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id.; Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Irma: Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395 (Jan. 31, 2018) (“It 
beat Super Typhoon Haiyan, which maintained winds at that level for 24 hours in 2013.”). 
105 Kimberly Amadeo, “Hurricane Irma: Facts, Damage, and Costs,” The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395 (Jan. 31, 2018). 
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Irma made landfall eight times:106 on Barbuda on September 6107 (Category 5, 185 
miles per hour108); St. Marten (Category 5, 185 miles per hour);109 British Virgin Islands 
(two landfalls, Category 5, 185 miles per hour);110 Little Inagua, Bahamas (Category 5, 
160 miles per hours);111 northern Cuba on September 9, flooding Havana112 (Category 3-
4, 125-160 miles per hour113); Florida Keys on September 10114 (Category 4, 130 miles 
per hour115); and finally in southwest Florida (Category 3, 115 miles per hour).116 Along 
the way, Hurricane Irma knocked out power in Puerto Rico (September 7) and dumped 
15 inches of rain on Haiti and the Dominican Republic (September 7).117 In Barbuda, 
Hurricane Irma damaged 90 percent of the buildings, “destroyed almost all 
communication, and left 60 percent of the population homeless.”118 In its wake, Barbuda 
was entirely evacuated, and few people have returned.119 In the British Virgin Islands, 
“Hurricane Irma made two direct landfalls . . ., both at peak intensity; one on Tortola and 
another on Ginger Island. Damage in the BVI was extensive, and on some islands it was 
catastrophic. Many buildings and roads were left in ruins.”120  The hurricane then traveled 
to the U.S. Virgin Islands, decimating St. John,121 before traveling the entire length of 
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Florida from south to north.122 The Florida Keys suffered 12 inches of rain and a storm 
surge of 10 feet.123 “The most rain in the state fell on Fort Pierce. It received 15.9 inches. 
The strongest winds (142 mph) hit Naples.”124 At least 102 people died from the storm, 
75 in Florida alone.125 
 
According to the National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Irma was the fifth costliest 
tropical storm in the United States, causing $50 billion in damages.126 In the United 
States, Hurricane Irma’s primary victims were in Florida. At the time Irma made landfall 
in Florida, the state contained 1.7 million NFIP policyholders, representing 35 percent of 
NFIP participants nationwide.127 Moreover, 15,000 Florida homes are NFIP repetitive-
loss properties.128 NFIP policyholders damaged by Hurricane Irma had received $179 
million in payouts as of early November 2017.129 
 
However, Hurricane Irma could have been far worse for cities like Miami. Even 
though “Miami-Dade, Monroe and Broward counties’ building codes have the nation's 
highest wind standards,”130 south Florida probably could not have withstood Irma at its 
strongest. As it was, when “Irma hit Miami with winds of 90 mph[, t]hree cranes collapsed 
and streets flooded.”131 As the news reported, “‘There’s no structure in Miami that’s built 
to withstand 185 mph winds,’ Keith Wolfe, president U.S. property and casualty for Swiss 
Re” said.132 In addition, “70 percent of the region’s buildings were built before 1994. 
Many of them have not been retrofitted. Even high-rises built to higher wind codes will 
suffer from heavy rains that seep in through roofs.”133 
 
C. Hurricane Maria: The Devastation of Puerto Rico 
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After forming as a tropical storm on September 16, 2017, Maria rapidly 
intensified into a Category 5 hurricane. It first made landfall on September 18 on 
Dominica, devastating the island.134 Maria also battered the U.S. Virgin Islands for a 
second time, and about 80 percent of those islands remained without power for more than 
a month.135 
 
What Hurricane Maria is most infamous for, however, is its destruction of Puerto 
Rico, a U.S. territory. On September 20, Hurricane Maria made landfall on Puerto Rico 
as a Category 4 hurricane,136 “the strongest storm to hit Puerto Rico in 85 years.”137 “The 
hurricane knocked out power to more than 90 percent of the island, and largely disrupted 
cell and water service.”138 “The energy grid [wa]s heavily damaged, with an island-wide 
power outage”139; Maria also destroyed Puerto Rico’s radar.140 On September 22, “The 
National Weather Service order[ed] the evacuation of about 70,000 people living near the 
Guajataca River in northwest Puerto Rico because a dam [wa]s in danger of failing.”141 
Officially, 64 people died because of the storm, but some news agencies put the number 
closer to 1000.142 
 
The U.S. government received serious criticism for not responding adequately to 
Puerto Rico’s devastation.143 Hurricane Maria “destroyed thousands of homes, killed at 
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least 64 people and left thousands without electricity or water for months.”144 A month 
after the hurricane, about 35 percent of Puerto Rico’s 3.4 million residents still lacked 
access to clean water, and FEMA’s emergency provisions appeared to many to fall far 
short of basic human needs.145 As of late January 2018, “about 60,000 homes are still 
without roofs, 2.3 million people live in areas at risk of water contamination, and 15.5% 
of the population still lacks electricity.”146 By mid-February 2018, “99% of customers in 
Puerto Rico had running water, and 84% of the island had power back,” but “[m]ore than 
400,000 customers still don’t have electricity.”147  Nevertheless, despite a FEMA error 
that sparked fears that aid to the island was ending, that aid continues.148 
 
“From a meteorological standpoint, Maria was nearly a worst-case scenario for 
the territory: The center of a huge, nearly Category 5 hurricane made a direct hit on Puerto 
Rico, lashing the island with wind and rain for longer than 30 hours.”149 The NFIP applies 
in Puerto Rico through MAPFRE, which sells flood insurance policies for island 
properties pursuant to a contract with FEMA.150 Moreover, on November 1, FEMA made 
it easier for policyholders damaged by Maria to make claims, including a $20,000 
advance.151 However, most homeowners on the island lacked even basic wind damage 
insurance,152 let alone a NFIP policy for flooding—there were only 5675 NFIP policies 
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in force on Puerto Rico, an island with 1.57 housing units.153 As a result, Puerto Rican 
homeowners have been paid only $121,000 under the program.154 
 
Nevertheless, even though Hurricane Maria is not contributing much to the 
NFIP’s debt, it now ranks as the third costliest hurricane in U.S. history. It caused $90 
billion in damages, less than Hurricanes Katrina (2005) and Harvey but more than 2012’s 
Hurricane Sandy.155   
 
D. The 2017 Hurricane Season, Climate Change, and the NFIP 
 
Together, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria made 2017 the costliest hurricane 
season in U.S. history, surpassing the previous record set in 2005, the year of Hurricanes 
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.156 However, the season had some other notable features, as 
well. First, according to The Weather Channel, in 2017, “[s]eventeen named storms, 10 
hurricanes, and 6 major (Category 3 or stronger) hurricanes tore through the Atlantic 
Basin, well above the 30-year average of 12 storms, 6 hurricanes and 2 major hurricanes. 
This placed 2017 among the top 10 most active Atlantic seasons on record . . . .”157 
Besides Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, the named storms included Arlene (tropical 
storm, central Atlantic), Bret (tropical storm, near Trinidad), Cindy (tropical storm, 
landfall in Texas/Louisiana), Don (tropical storm, east-southeast of Barbados), Emily 
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(tropical storm, landfall in Florida), Franklin (Category 1 hurricane, landfall in Mexico), 
Gert (Category 1 hurricane, stays in Atlantic), Jose (Category 4 hurricane, east-southeast 
of Leeward Islands), Katia (Category 1 hurricane, landfall in Mexico), Lee (Category 3 
hurricane, west-southwest of Cabo Verde islands), Nate (Category 1 hurricane, landfall 
in Mississippi/Louisiana), Ophelia (Category 3 hurricane, northeast Atlantic, landfall as 
a tropical storm in Ireland), Philippe (tropical storm, landfall in Florida), and Rina 
(tropical storm, east of Bermuda).158  
 
Second, Tropical Storm Arlene, the first of the season, formed on April 20, 2017, 
“more than a month before the beginning of hurricane season[and] the second earliest-
forming tropical cyclone in the Atlantic in the satellite era (or since 1966).”159 Third, 
Hurricane Maria, like Hurricane Irma, reached Category 5 strength, making 2017 only 
the second hurricane season in which two Category 5 storms made landfall.160 Fourth, 
“[t]he 2017 Atlantic hurricane season was also the first season since records began in 
1851 to have two Category 4 hurricanes make continental U.S. landfall in the same year 
(Harvey and Irma) . . . .”161 Fifth, “Irma, Jose and Katia marked the first time since 2010 
that three hurricanes were active in the Atlantic Ocean at the same time.”162 Sixth, in 
October 2017, Ophelia became the tenth consecutively named storm to achieve hurricane 
status, the fourth recorded time—and first time since 1893—that ten consecutive 
hurricanes have occurred.163 Notably, Ophelia also traveled to Wales, Scotland, and 
Ireland.164 Finally, “September 2017, featuring Category 5 Hurricanes Irma and Maria 
and Category 4 Hurricane Jose, was the most active month of any Atlantic hurricane 
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season on record in terms of Accumulated Cyclone Energy (ACE).”165 The September 
2017 storms included Irma, Jose, Katia, Lee and Maria, and “Lee and Katia were the only 
ones to not reach Category 4 or Category 5 intensity at their peaks.”166 
 
As the studies linking climate change to Hurricane Harvey’s severe rainfall 
suggest, evidence indicates that climate change is making Atlantic hurricanes more likely, 
stronger, and more frequent. In 2008, James Elsner, James Kossin, and Thomas Jagger 
reported in Nature that Atlantic hurricanes had been getting stronger on average over the 
last 30 years.167 Notably, “Hurricane Patricia, in 2015, set the record at the time for top 
wind speed—215 miles per hour—in the north Atlantic. The next year Winston shattered 
records as the most intense cyclone in the Southern Hemisphere.”168 Climate models also 
predict more Category 4 and 5 storms,169 and warming ocean waters will continue to fuel 
hurricanes as they did in 2017, when “[u]nusually warm water in the area where 
hurricanes form in the Atlantic Ocean fueled the powerful storms, which formed when 
the peak of the season arrived in late August.”170 Overall, scientists conclude, events like 
Hurricane Harvey will become more likely.171 
 
Climate change thus poses a real problem for the NFIP when it comes to coastal 
properties, because current insurance is not structured to reflect the need for climate 
change adaptation. As Edward Richards has summarized: 
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The role of insurance in driving adaptation is limited because most 
insured risks are short-term weather risks that are not tightly linked 
to climate change during the time period of the typical insurance 
policy. The best fit is insurance for flooding of coastal communities 
that is exacerbated by baked-in sea level rise and climate change 
enhanced storms. Such properties are currently insured by a 
combination of National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) 
policies, some private excess coverage for flooding, and federal 
disaster relief that is provided after specific events. This bundle of 
resources is highly subsidized and encourages rebuilding in areas 
that are already at high risk and which will eventually be 
inundated.172 
 
The 2017 hurricane season certainly had an effect on the NFIP’s fiscal stability. 
In the wake of the 2017 hurricane season, the NFIP reached its approximately $30 billion 
borrowing limit, prompting Congress in October 2017 to forgive $16 billion of the 
program’s debt.173 However, continuing claims from the storms led the program to 
borrow another $6.1 billion in early November 2017, bringing its debt back up to more 
than $20.5 billion.174 As of early December 2017, Harvey, Irma, and Maria had generated 
more than 120,000 NFIP policy claims, for which FEMA had paid $6.687 billion.175 
FEMA expects payouts for the three hurricanes to total between $8.5 and $9.5 billion.176 
 
More broadly, some call the 2017 hurricane season a harbinger of what climate 
change means for coastal storms.177 The NFIP, however, has not been updated for climate 
change and instead relies on historical flood data.178 As a result, without substantial 
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reforms, its coverage of coastal properties is likely to increasingly diverge from reality. 
“In 2016, the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office estimated that damage from 
hurricanes costs roughly $28 billion per year. Over the next 60 years, those costs are 
expected to rise at least 40%, after adjusting for inflation.”179 
 
The CBO, in preparing its advice to Congress in September 2017, was well aware 
that climate change could complicate coastal flooding and the NFIP’s solvency. As one 
source of uncertainty, for example, it noted that “scientists are seeking to better 
understand how climate change might affect sea temperatures ad wind shear and how 
these changes, in turn, could affect the frequency and intensity of hurricanes.”180 In 
addition, it noted that “in the coming decades, coastal development and the effects of 
climate change are expected to increase property damage from coastal flooding. Climate 
change could increase damage by raising sea levels and potentially also by increasing the 
intensity of hurricanes.”181 
 
 
III. THE 2017-2018 NFIP REAUTHORIZATION PROCESS: 
IS CONGRESS THINKING ABOUT HURRICANES AND CLIMATE CHANGE? 
 
As the discussions above make clear, the impacts of climate change and coastal 
storms on coastal properties create real financial problems for the NFIP. The 
reauthorization process in 2017 and 2018 provides an opportunity to use the NFIP as a 
means both to educate the American public about the real risks of living along the Gulf of 
Mexico and southeastern coast and to reform the law to dis-incentivize continued coastal 
development. At the same time, the NFIP, by rewarding efforts to mitigate storm damage, 
could encourage active climate change adaptation. As the Union of Concerned Scientists 
has recommended, “Reforming our insurance system to reflect this growing exposure can 
help communicate the true risks to coastal communities so they are motivated to take 
protective steps.”182  
 
The question, of course, is whether Congress will make the most of this 
opportunity. This part reviews the 2017-2018 NFIP reauthorization process for signs that 
hurricanes matter. 
 
A. Hurricanes and the Last NFIP Reauthorization 
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Hurricanes have prompted congressional reforms of the NFIP in the past, although 
those reforms were short lived. In 2012, Congress enacted the Biggert Waters Flood 
Insurance Act183 “to eliminate the NFIP's debt by increasing flood insurance rates to 
reflect the true cost of owning coastal property.”184 This Act introduced the concepts of 
the 100-year and 500-year floodplain185 and provided for a national flood mapping 
program.186 It tried to eliminate subsidized flood insurance for certain properties, 
including repetitive-loss properties,187 and increased the rate at which premiums could be 
increased.188 In addition, the Act required that premiums reflect the real flood risk that 
properties face: 
 
any property located in an area that is participating in the national flood 
insurance program shall have the risk premium rate charged for flood 
insurance on such property adjusted to accurately reflect the current risk of 
flood to such property, subject to any other provision of this Act. Any 
increase in the risk premium rate charged for flood insurance on any 
property that is covered by a flood insurance policy on the effective date of 
such an update that is a result of such updating shall be phased in over a 5–
year period, at the rate of 20 percent for each year following such effective 
date.189 
 
The Act also intended to phase out grandfathering, “a practice that enables property 
owners to keep their old premium prices when a new FEMA flood map reclassifies them 
into a higher-risk flood zone.”190 Biggert-Waters “represented a bipartisan effort to 
improve actuarial soundness and program solvency.”191 
 
 Less well-discusses is Biggert-Waters’ recognition that coastal flooding was an 
increasingly important threat. In addition to amending the National Flood Insurance Act, 
Biggert-Waters also amended the Integrated Coastal and Ocean Observation System Act 
of 2009192 to require the development of a Named Storm Event Model, accurate to 90 
percent, that could identify named tropical storms and hurricanes that pose a threat to 
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coastal states and generate post-storm assessments.193 This model would then be used to 
help calculate loss allocations between wind and water for indeterminate losses along the 
coast—generally, properties completely destroyed by a storm.194 
 
Biggert-Waters represents one swing of the congressional pendulum regarding the 
NFIP, toward fiscal solvency. However, fiscal solvency measures can run counter to 
political will and the desires of coastal property owners to avoid facing the true costs of 
the risks they are incurring. Coastal property owners responded to Biggert Waters’ 
enactment with panic and opposition,195 and with some justification. Following Biggert 
Waters’ enactment, according to the GAO, “about 438,000 policies nationwide had 
higher premiums immediately,”196 and some of the increases were substantial. For 
example, many New Yorkers faced increases in their annual flood insurance premiums 
of between $10,000 and $15,000.197 In 2013, one woman in Massachusetts “was hit with 
a $68,000 insurance bill.”198 
 
As a result, Biggert-Waters’ reforms were short-lived. Opposition “culminated in 
the passage of the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014[199] . . . which 
repealed many key provisions of Biggert-Waters.”200 This Act “favors a more gradual 
increase to full-risk premiums and thus softens the ‘blow’ of Biggert-Waters on coastal 
homeowners.”201 “[P]olicyholders in high-risk areas who purchased flood insurance after 
Biggert-Waters went into effect, and had to pay a full-risk rate, are eligible for a refund 
under the Act.”202  
 
B. The CBO’s Recommended 12 Policy Approaches in 2017 
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 In its September 2017 report on the NFIP, the CBO identified for Congress 12 
policy approaches that the reauthorization legislation could take. The CBO grouped these 
suggestions into four categories—increase receipts; reduce subsidies; shift costs away 
from the NFIP; or adjust premiums to better reflect underlying risk factors—and 
evaluated against three potential congressional goals: improving the program’s solvency; 
better aligning premiums and risk; and keeping costs low for policyholders.203   
 
These potential congressional goals are, of course, tradeoffs; in particular, as 
Biggert-Waters demonstrated, the goals of improving the NFIP’s solvency and of keeping 
costs low for all policyholders are in considerable tension. Thus, as might be expected, 
no single policy option that the CBO suggested can achieve all three posited goals for the 
NFIP reauthorization.204 For example, shortening the phase-out period for discounted 
premium rates would improve the program’s solvency and better align premium 
payments with actual risk, but this approach would increase the costs to policyholders.205 
In contrast, adjusting premium rates to reflect the property’s actual value would better 
align premium payments with actual risk and would keep costs low for owners of lower-
value properties, but this approach would not improve the program’s solvency, and rates 
could go up for owners of higher-value properties.206 Recognizing that Congress has 
vacillated regarding its policy priorities for the NFIP in the past,207 the CBO did not 
recommend any particular course of action for the NFIP reauthorization. 
 
C. NFIP Reauthorization Efforts 
 
 After its 2012 reauthorization, the NFIP was set to expire on September 30, 
2017.208 A series of congressional actions have extended the program’s effective date to 
March 23, 2018,209 but it has not yet been fully reauthorized. 
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 On November 14, 2017, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2874, The 21st 
Century Flood Insurance Reform Act,210 by a 237-189 vote.211 While “[t]he House 
Financial Services Committee drafted the legislation well before hurricanes Harvey, 
Irma, and Maria ravaged the southern coast of the United States and its territories,” “the 
monster storms added a new sense of urgency behind efforts to update the flood insurance 
program.”212 
 
 H.R. 2874 would extend the NFIP for five years beyond its original September 
2017 expiration.213 It contains measures both in improve the affordability of NFIP 
insurance and to more accurately reflect the risks to coastal properties. It also includes a 
variety of kinds of transparency measures intended to ensure that property owners 
understand both their insurance premiums and the flood risks they face. 
 
 Regarding affordability measures, H.R. 2874 first reduces the cap on annual 
increases in premiums from 18 percent to 15 percent.214 It also authorizes states to create 
flood insurance affordability programs for low-income policyholders.215 After FEMA 
approves these subsidies, the cost would be borne by other policyholders in the same 
state.216 In addition, the bill would require FEMA to finalize a monthly installment 
premium payment plan first required in the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability 
Act of 2014.217 Other measures in the bill encourage community-based218 and private 
flood insurance,219 as well as flood damage savings accounts.220 
 
 Nevertheless, H.R. 2874 also contemplates that premiums for coastal properties 
should, in general, reflect the real risks that those properties face. It requires the FEMA 
Administrator to consider the differences between inland and coastal properties when 
calculating premium rates.221 The revised premiums for coastal properties would be 
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implemented two years after the bill is enacted.222 In addition, H.R. 2874 would allow 
premiums to be calculated not just based on the flood maps, but also in light of “other 
risk assessment data and tools, including risk assessment models and scores from 
appropriate sources . . . .”223 Communities participating in the NFIP would have to 
develop and implement community-specific plans to mitigate flood risks in areas 
repeatedly damaged by floods,224 and repetitive-loss properties would be subject to 
premium adjustments to reflect their flood risk, plus would have to mitigate those risks 
to keep flood insurance available.225 At the same time, however, for other properties, H.R. 
2874 would amend previous mitigation measure provisions to allow a reduction in the 
risk premium rates for people who employ such measures.226 
 
 Finally, to increase transparency, H.R. 2874 would first require that FEMA 
disclose its methodology for calculating risk-based premiums.227 It would also require the 
FEMA Administrator to clearly communicate for all new and renewed policies the 
policyholders’ “full flood risk determinations” and “the number and dollar value of 
claims for the property, over the life of the property . . . .”228 Current owners may also 
request any historical flood and flood insurance information from FEMA, and FEMA 
must respond within 30 days.”229 Most dramatically, H.R. 2874 requires state and local 
governments to impose, “by statute or regulation, a duty on any seller or lessor of 
improved real estate located [in a flood zone] to provide any purchaser or lessee of such 
property a property flood hazard disclosure”230 that meets a list of federal disclosure 
requirements.231 If states and local governments fail to comply, no new NFIP policies will 
be provided.232 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, coastal interests object to the House’s approach. Notably, 
“Republicans representing coastal districts urged their colleagues to vote against the bill, 
warning it would make flood insurance less affordable for their constituents and threaten 
the solvency of the NFIP.”233 The bill is now with the Senate awaiting further action. 
 
 
																																																						
222 Id. § 105(c). 
223 Id. § 301(a)(2). 
224 Id. § 402(c). 
225 Id. § 504(b), (g). 
226 Id. § 113(b). 
227 Id. § 104. 
228 Id. § 107(a)(1). 
229 Id. § 108(b). 
230 Id. § 109(a). 
231 Id. § 109(b). 
232 Id. § 109(a). 
233 Zachary Warmbrodt, “House passes flood insurance renewal in wake of massive storms,” Politico, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/14/house-passes-flood-insurance-reauthorization-244908 (Nov. 
14, 2017). 
 ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG DRAFT 32 
CONCLUSION 
 
 With sufficient political will, the NFIP could become an insurance program that 
both highlights and educates Americans about the increasing risks that climate change 
poses to the nation’s coasts as a result of the combination of warming waters, rising tides, 
and generally shifting weather patterns, including increasing numbers of increasing 
severe (windy and rainy) storms. Several aspects of H.R. 2874 are a step in the right 
direction, including: (1) allowing different premium rates for coastal properties compared 
to inland properties; (2) broadening the tools allowed for calculating flooding risk, which 
could include subsidence and erosion information and sea-level rise projections for 
particular coastal locations; (3) ensuring that both current and future coastal owners 
understand the flooding and storm risks that their properties face; and (4) providing 
potentially more effective means for dealing with areas and properties subject to repeated 
flooding and loss. 
 
 Nevertheless, the NFIP reauthorization process has not yet fully embraced the 
realities either of the 2017 hurricane season or of climate change. First, the 2017 hurricane 
season taught us that many more properties are at risk from coastal storms than the flood 
maps acknowledge. However, some of those properties really are, still, only at risk during 
a “freak” or unusual (“1000-year”) storm, while others are at risk in virtually every 
tropical storm season. The NFIP could better differentiate these relative risks and, 
possibly, expand the eligible pool of properties to include properties that could benefit 
from flood insurance truly designed to protect against the rare catastrophe—that is, 
“coastal” properties for which, collectively over the long term, are likely to pay far more 
in NFIP premiums that they require in payments (as is generally the case with home 
casualty insurance). 
 
 Second, both the 2017 hurricane season and climate change in general teach us 
that “risk” is now a rapidly evolving concept. As a result, the NFIP reauthorization should 
require FEMA to update flood risks, particularly along the coast, on a much more regular 
basis—perhaps even continually. These risk updates, moreover, should have to take 
account of the latest and best projections from climate scientists and coastal erosion and 
subsidence experts to try to anticipate how flood risks along the coasts are changing, 
rather than just “hindcasting” based on past experience. 
 
 Finally, in light of climate change, the NFIP should become a program to 
encourage coastal retreat, particularly in areas already subject to repeated flooding and 
destruction. I have suggested elsewhere that Congress consider a “twice and out” policy 
that deems properties purchased by the federal government when NFIP payouts reach 
twice the fair market value of the property.234 Edward Richards, in contrast, has advocated 
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for insuring coastal properties according to a life insurance model.235 Other approaches 
are possible, but for any property where premiums do not match government liability, 
such a presumption of a buyout strategy should be constitutionally sound and would help 
to facilitate the inevitable progression of the ocean inland. 
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